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1.  Introduction 
Social protection aims to protect citizens against uninsurable shocks. This is usually 
achieved through the introduction of contributory funds (such as pensions and 
unemployment benefits) and through the provision of non-contributory safety-nets, 
financed through general taxation. The former includes an insurance component, while 
the latter responds to assistance needs. In the evolution of Bismarkian welfare system, 
social protection has moved from insurance to assistance, as well as from selective to 
universal. 
Safety-nets represent a significant portion of poverty-reduction strategies, but 
they may also have an efficiency-enhancing effect. In fact, they do not promote growth 
per se, but they may have important impacts on the investment choices of families, 
including the education of their children (Grosh et al., 2008). By lengthening the time 
horizon of financially constrained families and/or by helping them to cope with risky 
periods of adverse fortunes, safety-nets may have beneficial effects on the education of 
children. 
The channel through which school attendance is at risk in the face of negative 
shocks (famine, war, flood, accident or death of household breadwinner, etc) is twofold: 
families hit by negative shocks tend to reduce all expenditure (including school 
expenditure, which accounts for a large portion of household incomes1) and try to resort 
to child labour as an additional source of income. In both cases, the likely outcome is a 
reduction in children school attendance, especially among girls. 
This amplifies the long-term impact of adverse shocks, for two reasons. On the 
one hand, given the high inter-generational persistence in educational attainment, it 
creates a negative spill-over on future generations. On the other hand, the gender-biased 
impact of reduction in school attendance has a long-term impact, because greater 
education for girls has been proven to have a positive impact on the health of infants and 
children, on immunisation rates and on family nutrition (Bruns et al., 2003). 
In order to isolate school participation from negative shocks, international 
agencies put more and more emphasis on conditional cash transfers (Fiszbein and 
Schady 2009). These transfers condition the release of aid on the use of specific health 
and education services by the programme beneficiaries. They may be rationalised by the 
possibility of households under-investing in the human capital of their children (due to 
either incorrect beliefs about the returns to education, or to “imperfect altruism” between 
parents and their children and/or “sexual discrimination” among children genders). 
Conditional cash transfers have been shown to increase enrolments in several studies, 
mainly conducted in Latin America.2 In the long run, the increase in the education 
achieved should lower inequalities in education, thereby lowering inequality in incomes 
(Grosh et al., 2008). 
Despite recognising the crucial role of education, most African countries do not 
have the financial resources to create universal and effective safety-nets (African Union 
2008). The recognition of the critical role of education goes back to 1962 when some 
African countries committed themselves to “Education for all children by 1980” in the 
Addis Ababa Declaration. However, more than 40 years after that declaration, achieving 
universal education remains a major challenge in Africa. While the Millennium 
Development Goal considered the achievement of universal education by 2010, at an 
estimated cost for Africa of 1.9 billion US dollars per year (Bruns et al., 2003), there is 
now discussion about what might constitute a reasonable target in order to accomplish 
this goal. 
                                                
1  Between 5 and 20% of total household income, according to Grosh et al. 2008, p.15. 
2  See a summary table of existing studies at pg.17-18 of Fiszbein et al. 2009. 
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In the present paper, we discuss the relationship between social protection and 
educational investment in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. This relationship is a 
complex one, because it has a two-fold nature along an inter-temporal dimension. Let us 
discuss some of these relationships. 
First of all, social protection may be effective in raising school attendance and 
therefore increasing educational investment, as long as poor households are prevented 
from doing so by financial constraints. Analysis based upon micro-data confirms that 
household income is one of the main determinants of school attendance, jointly with 
parental education and access to education, as measured by the distance to the school 
(Garcia and Fares 2008, reporting analysis conducted on Burkina Faso and Tanzania).
3 
However, school availability has a relatively low impact on raising school attendance, 
especially when compared to school quality measures, such as the number of students 
per teacher (Filmer 2007, working on micro-data from 21 poor countries including Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe). However, the costs 
of attendance are heterogeneous in the population, varying according to family wealth 
and child gender (Arnold Lincove 2009, working on micro-data from Nigeria). Family 
wealth, as proxied by alternative summary measures obtained from durable possession 
and housing characteristics, reveals itself to be a significant determinant of primary 
school attendance (Filmer and Prichett 1999, working on DHS surveys for 35 countries). 
The second aspect concerns whether educational investment is worth undertaking. 
Most of the literature agrees about the existence of economic returns associated with 
education in Africa, related to both higher wages and higher probability of employment. 
The estimated effects in Africa are in line with those observed in other regions: the 
average return to an additional year of schooling in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 
about 12 percent (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). New evidence suggests that 
returns increase with the level of education and that returns to higher education have 
been rising (Garcia and Fares 2008). Returns are kept high by the low cost of the 
attendance of secondary and tertiary institutions, where the offspring of better-educated 
families are disproportionately represented (Schultz 2004). There are cross-country 
variations, associated with the level of development (proxied by the GDP per capita 
and/or by life expectancy) and with freedom of economic initiatives (King et al., 2010). 
If children from poor families are prevented from schooling by lack of money, and 
schooling is associated to higher earnings and better employment prospects over the life-
span of the children, then raising family incomes through assistance funds represents a 
form of social protection with regard to children, since it will modify their perspectives 
with regard to their economic life. In fact, education can be considered as a means to 
provide permanent social protection for at least five reasons: 
• it raises employability, which, in the African context, means raising the transition 
probability from the informal/subsistence sector to the formal sector; 
• it raises individual permanent income/consumption/welfare over the life-span, which 
may translate into higher wealth/better quality of housing/possession of durables; 
• it reduces individual income risk, due to longer employment contract length/reduced 
unemployment spell/higher pensions; 
• due to inter-generational transmission of socio-economic status, by increasing 
education in one generation, it positively affects all the following generations; 
                                                
3  Income shocks are also important determinants of schooling. Children in Burkina Faso from 
households experiencing a negative income shock are less likely to enrol in school. The effect is 
strongest for households in the lowest income quintile. In Tanzania the adult employment rate is 
negatively correlated with schooling, suggesting that as adults face more problems in the labour 
market, school enrolment of their children also declines.  
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• due to positive correlation between growth and human capital accumulation, 
increased educational attainment in the population raises output growth, which, in 
turn, represents a powerful engine to draw people out of poverty.4 
In the present paper, we provide additional support to this claim, by studying 
educational attainment in African countries both at the macro and at the micro level. We 
provide macro-evidence on the existing school participation in all the African countries 
that we were able to collect information about, showing the correlation between school 
enrolment and literacy rates in the population. We also estimate sample correlations 
between enrolment and macro-aggregates, related to resources (GDP per capita, 
student/teacher ratio), computing some counterfactuals. We then move to micro-data, 
selecting three African countries as representative examples of low (Mauritania), middle 
(Uganda) and high (Ghana) educational attainment. Using social surveys conducted in 
these countries, we estimate the returns to education in terms of better quality of 
employment (for those who are in the labour market) and of higher monetary returns 
(for the sub-sample of those earning a monetary wage). In addition, we collapse the data 
at household level, in order to study the determinants of individual educational 
attainment of children aged between 5 and 25, in order to show the correlation between 
parental education, the availability of schools at community level, external shocks (such 
as drought, famine, and war) and the individual probability of attending school. Policy 
implications are discussed in the conclusions. 
2.  Aggregate evidence on school participation 
One of the main problems when aiming to aggregate studies on Africa is the lack 
of data, not to mention their quality and comparability over time. Table 1 provides the 
best of the comparable recent information that we were able to collect for the entire 
continent. The overall picture suggests that the two extremes, the Northern and 
Southern regions, are better endowed than the rest of the continent in terms of school 
participation, with the former well ahead in terms of secondary and tertiary education. 
Western Africa is the region where school attendance seems problematical, even if it 
could simply be lagging on the same scholarisation path previously experienced by other 
countries. This trend is well summarised in Table 2: in the last decade, most of the 
countries achieved almost full participation in primary education (which now scores at 
100% in terms of gross rates and at 78% in terms of net rates).5 Secondary school 
participation also increased by 12 percent points, while tertiary education is stagnating at 
a dramatic level below 4%. 
The overall picture is well summarised by Figures 1 to 3, which plots the country 
distribution according to the (gross) enrolment rates available at the end of the current 
decade. From Figure 1, it clearly appears that the limited access to primary education is 
mainly concentrated in the sub-Saharan region (downward extending to Congo 
Democratic Republic). Since education is a vertically integrated process, a shortage of 
primary educated pupils lowers enrolment rates at secondary level, which may remain 
low for additional reasons as well (see the case of Angola and Mozambique in Figure 2). 
Finally, tertiary education is limited in almost all countries, with some notable exceptions 
given by all North African countries, South Africa and Liberia (see Figure 3). What is 
sometimes called the “poverty belt” is also an “illiteracy belt”, constituted by the 
countries at the bottom of the country rankings by enrolment rates: Burkina Faso, Niger, 
Chad, Sudan and Central African Republic. 
                                                
4 Oketch 2006 shows that the relationship between economic growth and educational attainment is 
more complex, considering the spillover on physical capital accumulation and concluding that 
the sources of labour productivity growth in the medium term in African countries are high 
investment in physical capital and in human capital.  
5 Gross rates are computed by taking the ratio between students enrolled in a given school level 
and the corresponding population in the relevant age, while net rates restrict the denominator 
to the students in the relevant age. Grade repetition raises gross rates, but not net ones. 
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Figure 1 – Primary gross enrolment – Africa 2010 
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Figure 2 – Secondary gross enrolment – Africa 2010 
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Figure 3 – Tertiary gross enrolment – Africa 2010 
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Table 1 – Literacy rates and school participation – Africa mid 2000’s 
Country 
Adult 
literacy rate 
Primary 
gross 
enrolment 
Secondary gross 
enrolment 
Tertiary 
gross 
enrolment 
Northern Africa 68.66 104.66 69.05 23.91 
Algeria 71.26 109.51 80.52 20.25 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 68.89 96.30 77.74 29.76 
Libya 87.30 111.74 103.34 51.42 
Mauritania 54.00 94.55 22.40 3.31 
Morocco 54.35 103.96 47.19 11.00 
Tunisia 76.15 111.90 83.13 27.70 
Central Africa 68.93 99.03 30.58 3.60 
Cameroon 72.15 104.88 29.16 5.80 
Central African Republic 51.59 69.22 11.9 1.74 
Chad 29.86 75.46 15.15 1.28 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 66.88 72.62 27.68 4.55 
Congo, Rep.  107.38 38.66 4.42 
Equatorial Guinea 89.99 99.45 27.4 3.26 
Gabon 85.40 134.62 51.29 7.05* 
Sao Tome and Principe 86.60 128.59 43.45 4.14 
Eastern Africa 67.54 92.63 34.78 2.62 
Burundi 62.60 93.0 13.4 2.03 
Comoros 71.00 120.2 41.4 2.22 
Djibouti  41.7 21.0 1.66 
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Eritrea 58.90 61.3 28.4 1.55 
Ethiopia 35.90 76.6 24.3 2.55 
Kenya 80.10 103.9 47.2 3.16 
Rwanda 67.60 129.7 16.0 2.68 
Seychelles 91.80 113.7 105.3 nd 
Sudan 65.10 57.5 31.1 5.93 
Tanzania 71.00 96.8 5.74* 1.19 
Uganda 71.40 124.4 19.7 3.25 
Western Africa 44.59 88.82 31.53 5.22 
Benin 37.73 103.33 31.27 5.57 
Burkina Faso 23.98 57.77 13.89 1.94 
Cape Verde 82.45 110.70 67.11 6.46 
Côte d’Ivoire 51.67 72.65 24.51 7.32 
Gambia, The 41.06 88.74 45.11 1.17 
Ghana 61.85 88.29 45.26 5.58 
Guinea 29.48 78.80 27.39 4.26 
Guinea-Bissau 46.18 106.25 27.36 1.53 
Liberia 56.00 103.82 33.47 17.39 
Mali 25.09 76.44 25.58 3.45 
Niger 19.03 46.99 8.81 1.03 
Nigeria 57.44 96.65 31.39 9.77 
Senegal 40.58 76.40 21.87 5.77 
Sierra Leone 37.31 117.53 30.54 2.06 
Togo 59.03 107.96 39.36 4.99 
Southern Africa 78.25 108.59 46.46 4.26 
Angola 68.50 81.37* 15.88 2.45 
Botswana 82.24 108.25 77.68 4.65 
Lesotho 87.88 113.52 35.52 2.97 
Madagascar 70.68 131.21 26.04 2.80 
Malawi 72.80 122.94 28.93 0.43 
Mauritius 85.90 100.03 84.18 14.66 
Mozambique 51.08 95.55 12.46 1.19 
Namibia 86.62 113.77 63.79 6.81 
South Africa 89.00 105.46 91.17 14.65*             
Swaziland 83.03 99.59 45.9 4.58 
Zambia 69.92 102.5 34.84 2.40 
Zimbabwe 91.40 101.64 41.11 3.95 
Source: Barro-Lee 2010 + Unesco website – * referred to 2000 
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Table 2 – School participation – Africa 2000 
Year 
Primary gross 
enrolment 
Secondary 
gross 
enrolment 
Tertiary gross 
enrolment 
2000 83.36 (43) 26.81 (40) 3.30 (36) 
2005 92.34 (45) 33.64 (44) 3.59 (39) 
2010 102.07 (44) 39.61 (38) 4.53 (34) 
Average decade 92.66 33.26 3.79 
Source: Barro-Lee 2010 + Unesco website – number of observations in brackets 
While enrolment rates represent flow measures, they obviously reflect stock 
measures of human capital. In Table 3, we report the adult population distribution by 
educational attainment, separating those who have completed a degree from those who 
have attended only some years of schooling. These variables (which, over the last 
decade, account for an average of 15% in primary education, 17% in secondary and 2% 
in tertiary education) could be taken as proxy measures of drop-out rates during the 
schooling experience.6 Overall, the African educational system has significant leakages, 
which can be grasped by looking at Figure 4. This graph plots the population distribution 
without education or with an attained degree: the distance from 100% represents the 
portion of the population of those who aimed to obtain a higher degree without attaining 
it. For some countries (notably Congo Republic, Senegal and Zimbabwe), this waste of 
education exceeds 60%! At the other extreme, some countries (Benin, for example) 
exhibit a very fluid educational system, even if this may be due to a large portion of the 
population not attending school (as in the case of Niger). 
Data on population distribution reflect a very static view, because it takes more 
than a generation to change the educational attainment in a population. For this reason, 
in Table 4, we resort to literacy rates, making a distinction between the young population 
(aged 15-24) and the entire population. Here, the increase in the population attending 
school is sizeable, with an increase of more than one percentage point per year in the 
portion of the population capable of reading and writing. Adopting the alternative 
standard measure of the average years of education in the population, we notice a trend 
increase of approximately one year of schooling every eleven years. Proceeding at this 
speed, Africa, as a whole, would catch up with the current values for Europe (10.3 years 
of schooling) in 43 years. Despite this, looking at Figure 5, we observe that sub-Saharan 
Africa is performing better than South Asia, in terms of human capital accumulation, with 
an acceleration in the last decades of the previous century, and signs of more recent 
slowing down. 
                                                
6 However in some cases this coding procedure account for cross-country differences in institutional 
design. Whenever a country system includes lower secondary and upper secondary schools, the 
completion of the former will be considered as “some secondary school attained”. 
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Table 3 – Measures of educational attainment: formal schooling – Africa 2000 
Year 
% pop wth 
no 
schooling 
% pop wth 
some 
primary 
education 
% pop wth 
primary 
completed 
% pop wth 
some 
secondary 
education 
% pop wth 
secondary 
completed 
% pop wth 
some 
tertiary 
education 
% pop wth 
tertiary 
education 
2000 39.80 15.85 16.55 15.38 9.46 1.53 1.42 
2005 35.96 15.24 17.79 16.78 10.59 1.86 1.77 
2010 32.27 13.69 19.89 18.66 11.03 2.26 2.19 
Average  36.01 14.93 18.08 16.94 10.36 1.89 1.79 
Source: Barro-Lee 2010 – data referred to 38 countries 
Table 4 – Measures of educational attainment: adult literacy and years of 
education – Africa 2000 
Year 
literacy 
rate youth 
15-24 
literacy 
rate entire 
population 
average 
years of 
education 
2000 56.28 (8) 47.13 (8) 4.71 (37) 
2005 71.20 (47) 59.38 (47) 5.15 (37) 
2010 77.84 (47) 66.46 (47) 5.58 (37) 
Average decade 73.09 61.68 5.15 
Source: Barro-Lee 2010 + Unesco website – number of observations in brackets 
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Figure 4 – Completed educational attainment – Africa 2010 
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Figure 5 – Average years of education – World 1950-2010 
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Table 5 – Resource indicators – Africa 2000 
Year pupil-teacher 
ratio - primary 
pupil-teacher 
ratio – 
secondary 
Public spending 
on educ as % 
GDP 
2000 42.10 (48) 23.72 (42) 4.17 (45) 
2005 42.44 (49) 23.79 (44) 4.32 (39) 
2010 42.46 (49) 25.31 (38) 4.67 (38) 
Average 2000-10 42.33 24.23 4.37 
Source: Barro-Lee 2010 + Unesco website – number of observations in brackets 
On average, African countries are continuing to invest resources in the attempt to 
foster this growth of human capital. This is clearly perceivable from Table 5, where the 
rising enrolment in both primary and secondary education shows a corresponding rise in 
the number of teachers, keeping the student/teacher ratio almost constant. Similarly, 
financial resources invested in education (as a fraction of GDP at constant prices) exhibit 
a weakly rising trend. 
A final image is offered by Figure 6, which depicts the country distribution in 
terms of the literacy rate of the young population. As we have already mentioned, the 
sub-tropical regions are characterised by a literacy rate in the adult population which is 
comparable to that of the developed countries, and Eastern Africa is following a similar 
lead (with the exception of Ethiopia). In contrast, most of the Western African countries 
maintain their disadvantage in terms of population reading and numeracy capabilities, 
with all the known implications in terms of under-development in the economic and 
political life. 
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Figure 6 – Youth literacy rate – Africa 2000 
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We now move to regression analysis, in order to dis-entangle the multivariate 
nature of the existing correlations. In Table 6, we estimate five different models that 
account for the dynamics of enrolment rates, disaggregated by educational level. Despite 
averaging over five years in order to minimise the problem of missing data, the dataset 
consists of an unbalanced panel with a maximum of three data points per country (2000, 
2005 and 2010). With a potential sample size of 162 observations, we work with an 
average of less than one hundred observations. Each equation includes regional and year 
dummies to control for remaining heterogeneity; errors are clustered by region and year. 
In columns 1-3, we start with our basic model, controlling for the (log of) GDP per 
capita at 2000 prices. This variable exhibits positive correlations in all specifications, with 
a semi-elasticity ranging between 8.7 and 15.1 for primary enrolment, from 15.4 to 25.4 
for secondary enrolment, and from 3.9 to 5.1 for tertiary enrolment. Taking midpoint 
estimates, they correspond to an estimated elasticity of 0.12 for primary enrolment, 0.55 
for secondary enrolment and 0.38 for tertiary enrolment.7 Since we may presume that 
GDP is pre-determined with regard to school enrolment, these results suggest that GDP 
growth promotes schooling, possibly alleviating liquidity constraints (as can be presumed 
by noticing that the elasticity is highest in the school level which is growing the most). 
We also control for the territorial distribution of the population, using both population 
density and either the fraction of population in rural areas (which is never significant) or 
the fraction of GDP produced in agriculture. The absence of significant correlations with 
both population density and population in rural areas would suggest that schooling is not 
prevented by difficult accessibility; quite the opposite is true: countries with a larger 
portion of GDP produced in agriculture are, on average, poorer than the rest, and 
nevertheless, if all other things are constant, they tend to have higher enrolment rates. 
                                                
7 They are respectively computed as (15.1+8.7)/(2*92), (15.4+25.4)/(2*37) and 
(3.9+5.1)/(2*5.8), using mean enrolments in the sample. 
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We aim to check for the institutional framework by means of two variables, a direct 
measure of the quality of institutions provided by the Index of African Governance,8 and 
the historical inheritance coming from the identity of past colonisers. The former variable 
is always positively correlated to school enrolment, indicating that a safer, just and stable 
political environment allows an increase child education. With regard to past colonisation, 
there is positive correlation of schooling with the past British domination, while a weak 
correlation emerges for Belgium (positive) and France (negative).[see page 18] All other 
dummies (controlling for other colonisers, single or combined) do not emerge as 
significant. Despite the fact that colonisation ended in the continent almost forty years 
ago, it is possible that the infrastructure built during domination may support current 
efforts for education. 
The role of the available resources is controlled in the second model (columns 4 to 
6), in which we find positive correlation with student/teacher ratios for primary and 
secondary enrolment (a similar variable is not available for tertiary education, and is 
proxied by public expenditure in education). If student/teacher ratio is taken as a proxy 
for school quality (as in the education literature for developed country - see Glewwe and 
Kremer 2006), we would get the counter-intuitive result that enrolment is growing where 
quality is declining. We prefer a different explanation, based upon the idea that countries 
which press for expanding education do it at the cost of increasing the size of the classes, 
thus increasing the number of students per teacher. Thus, we interpret these positive 
correlations as a sign of teacher shortage rather than an indication of a decline  in the 
quality of schooling. However, this result is robust under most specifications, for both 
educational levels (primary and secondary) as it draws our attention to the issue of the 
quality of education provided in some of these countries, where the number of students 
per teacher can be as high as 90 for primary schools (Malawi in 2010) (Filmer 2007). In 
contrast, financial resources invested in education emerge as not significant in all models 
estimated adopted in Table 6. 
In the third model (columns 7 to 9), we would like to control/check for the cultural 
environment. In order to minimise the loss of observations, instead of using data on 
literacy rates (to be analysed below), we use the portion of population without any 
educational attainment. This variable (which is pre-determined by construction) exerts a 
negative impact on primary and secondary schooling, also absorbing the correlation with 
the quality of governments. A favourable interpretation suggests that most of the quality 
of institutions lies in the educational attainment of their populations. 
In the fourth model (column 10 to 12), we would like to check whether schooling 
is negatively associated with poverty. Despite halving the sample size, there is some 
indication in the data that poverty is negatively correlated with secondary school 
enrolment, but these results are not strictly comparable with the previous results. Finally, 
the fifth model (columns 13 to 15) exploits the panel structure of the data by fitting them 
into a random effect model. Most of the previous results hold even in this framework, 
which suggests that they are rather robust. 
As a way of summary, we could say that school enrolment in Africa in recent 
years, especially at primary and secondary level, seems to be affected by: 
 the availability of income (as indicated by GDP per capita and – when available - by 
poverty rates); 
 past educational attainment in the population; 
 the stability and safety of the environment, assured by the quality of governance; 
                                                
8 The most recent value available is 2007, which is used for all years (to be replaced in 2000 and 
2005 by closer values when available). It summarise the scores on “Safety and Security”, “Rule 
of Law, Transparency, and Corruption”, “Participation and Human Rights”, “Sustainable 
Economic Opportunity” and “Human Development”. See http://www.nber.org/data/iag.html. 
See also Kaufmann et al. 2009. 
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 the availability of educational resources (as teachers and infrastructures). 
In Table 7, we now consider the determinants of literacy rates in the population, 
either in its young component (15-24 years old) or in its entirety. Once again, we find 
positive correlation with the stage of development proxied by the GDP per capita, but 
here the interpretation should be cautious, since reverse causality may be an issue. In 
this framework, rural societies (again proxied by the share of agricultural product in the 
GDP) do not seem to be prevented from achieving a high level of literacy. An interesting 
result emerges when the geographical shape of the territories are considered. While 
population density is not significant (not reported), countries without access to the 
oceans have coeteris paribus a lower level of literacy. Past colonisation indicates that 
British and Belgian domination favoured educational achievement, while it is statistically 
insignificant for the French domination. What seems to matter for literacy is the financial 
effort captured by the share of public expenditure in education, but, once again, we must 
be aware of potential reverse causality. All these results still hold when we go to a 
random effect model in columns 5 and 6. 
However, macro-analysis reports “average” forms of behaviour, which are 
informative about the size of the phenomena as well as of their temporal variations, but 
they do not help us to identify who the children more at risk of school absence are. For 
this reason, we complement this aggregate view with the investigation of household 
representative surveys for three African countries. 
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Table 6 - Determinants of gross enrolment rates – Africa 2000-2010 - OLS 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
primary 
second
ary 
tertiary primary 
seconda
ry 
tertiary primary 
seconda
ry 
tertiar
y 
primary 
seconda
ry 
tertiary 
RE 
primary 
RE 
second
ary 
RE 
tertiary 
log of GDP 
per capita 
(constant 
2000 US$) 
8.74 20.436 5.099 15.139 21.856 3.966 12.688 22.988 4.873 4.97 25.463 5.065 9.988 15.499 3.95 
 
[2.58]*
* 
[9.32]*
** 
[3.01]*
** 
[3.36]*
** 
[11.26]*
** 
[3.42]*
** 
[2.12]* [10.41]*
** 
[2.82]
** 
[1.23] [12.31]*
** 
[2.82]*
* 
[1.74]* [4.46]*
** 
[3.62]*
** 
Population 
density 
(people 
per sq_ 
km) 
0.021 -0.01 0.004 0.014 -0.011 0.005 0.006 -0.011 0.005 0.199 0 -0.003 0.029 0.012 0.007 
 
[0.65] [1.27] [0.90] [0.46] [1.28] [1.25] [0.32] [1.06] [0.89] [10.73]*
** 
[0.01] [0.33] [0.53] [0.63] [1.47] 
Agriculture 
% of GDP 
0.548 0.467 0.143 0.692 0.598 0.085 0.352 0.607 0.069 0.397 0.937 0.134 0.212 0.442 0.075 
 
[2.85]*
* 
[3.97]*
** 
[2.54]*
* 
[3.17]*
** 
[4.64]**
* 
[2.05]* [0.82] [3.37]**
* 
[0.93] [1.85]* [4.79]**
* 
[2.00]* [0.66] [3.98]*
** 
[1.97]*
* 
Index 
African 
Governanc
e 2007 
0.568 0.314 -0.123 0.544 0.416 -0.07 0.157 0.115 -0.083 0.597 0.622 -0.053 0.647 0.561 -0.083 
 
[3.75]*
** 
[2.53]*
* 
[2.36]*
* 
[4.50]*
** 
[2.78]** [1.81]* [0.74] [0.51] [1.89]
* 
[2.11]* [4.19]**
* 
[0.69] [2.23]*
* 
[2.09]*
* 
[1.70]* 
Colonizer: 
Belgium 
2.546 10.079 3.297 8.039 16.036 2.491 4.835 24.287 4.508 -22.351 18.013 6.643 3.953 3.135 2.606 
 
[0.28] [1.44] [1.36] [1.00] [1.93]* [1.33] [0.50] [3.28]**
* 
[1.09] [2.84]** [1.57] [3.66]*
** 
[0.26] [0.33] [1.04] 
Colonizer: 
Britain 
1.741 10.63 2.311 4.395 12.104 3.603 -7.37 10.767 4.964 8.833 8.058 4.511 2.396 10.354 3.629 
 
[0.46] [3.34]*
** 
[1.83]* [1.10] [3.04]**
* 
[2.25]*
* 
[1.21] [3.18]**
* 
[1.55] [0.92] [1.48] [1.83]* [0.40] [2.20]*
* 
[2.28]*
* 
Colonizer: 
France 
-3.146 -2.764 -0.369 -4.216 -1.129 1.474 -20.678 -8.804 2.106 4.751 -3.828 1.419 -10.167 -2.957 2.004 
 
[0.74] [0.88] [0.31] [0.77] [0.28] [1.55] [3.52]*
** 
[1.84]* [1.02] [0.55] [0.90] [1.04] [1.28] [0.57] [1.24] 
Pupil-
teacher 
ratio, 
primary 
   0.54   0.869   0.211   0.658   
 
   [2.72]*
* 
  [4.06]*
** 
  [1.11]   [3.09]*
** 
  
Pupil-
teacher 
ratio, 
secondary 
    0.39   0.641   0.249   0.276  
 
    [2.82]**   [2.64]**   [1.39]   [2.51]*
* 
 
Public 
spending 
on 
education 
(% GDP) 
     -0.02   -0.005   -0.392   -0.014 
      [0.20]   [0.04]   [1.67]   [0.13] 
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio at 
$1.25 a 
day (PPP) 
         -0.002 -0.237 -0.047    
 
         [0.01] [3.56]**
* 
[1.13]    
Percentage 
of No 
Schooling 
in 
Population 
      -0.661 -0.266 0.029       
 
      [6.78]*
** 
[4.91]**
* 
[0.88]       
Observatio
ns 
144 134 122 140 119 101 102 86 73 69 60 56 140 119 101 
R-squared 0.4 0.81 0.67 0.43 0.81 0.69 0.48 0.85 0.7 0.65 0.9 0.73 0.4 0.78 0.69 
Log 
likelihood 
-632.24 -505.81 -355.08 -609.9 -445.49 -274.43 -428.87 -307.55 -
205.7
1 
-280.48 -206 -155.76    
Number of 
_ID 
51 51 50 50 49 45 36 35 33 39 38 32 50 49 45 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust errors 
clustered by region+year – constant, region and year controls included 
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Table 7 - Determinants of literacy rate – Africa 2000-2010 - OLS 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 youth adult youth adult RE youth RE adult 
log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 9.781 10.522 7.863 8.878 7.03 6.262 
 [4.66]*** [4.75]*** [4.82]*** [4.37]*** [3.53]*** [2.69]*** 
Agriculture % of GDP 0.116 0.139 0.061 0.08 0.118 0.116 
 [1.21] [1.38] [0.35] [0.48] [1.09] [0.97] 
Landlocked -6.783 -5.462 -10.621 -7.612 -11.103 -10.672 
 [2.56]** [2.04]* [3.85]*** [2.44]** [2.56]** [2.46]** 
Coloniser: Belgium 9.748 14.958 10.834 12.184 10.7 11.698 
 [2.03]* [3.19]*** [1.51] [2.14]* [1.58] [1.55] 
Coloniser: Britain 7.547 7.286 6.777 6.826 6.512 6.436 
 [1.85]* [1.96]* [1.39] [1.42] [1.30] [1.16] 
Coloniser: France -6.293 -4.417 -5.076 -1.933 -7.217 -4.73 
 [1.20] [0.98] [1.05] [0.35] [1.13] [0.73] 
Public spending on education (% GDP)   2.476 2.273 1.466 0.951 
   [3.58]*** [3.63]*** [2.30]** [2.06]** 
Observations 97 97 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.74 0.74 
Log likelihood -368.51 -361.44 -270.9 -266.69   
Number of countries 49 49 41 41 41 41 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust errors 
clustered by region+year – constant, region and year controls included 
3.  Micro evidence on returns to education and 
school participation in selected countries (Ghana, 
Mauritania, Uganda) 
We have selected three sub-Saharan countries, which aims to be representative of this 
sub-continent. We have selected them mainly according to their level of educational 
attainment, not neglecting their different colonial experience. From Table 8, we notice 
that, despite a similar per capita income and a common past of British domination, 
Ghana has attained a higher level of educational attainment than Uganda, thanks to 
higher school participation at secondary and tertiary levels. In contrast, Mauritania, a 
former French colony, exhibits the lowest literacy rate, since most of the population still 
only receives primary schooling (as witnessed by the gross enrolment rates exceeding 
100%). 
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Table 8 – Descriptive statistics on selected countries – means 2000-10 
Country GDP per 
capita 
(2000 US 
dollars) 
literacy 
rate 
young 
population 
gross 
enrolment 
rate 
primary 
gross 
enrolment 
rate 
secondary 
gross 
enrolment 
rate 
tertiary 
Ghana 272.36 74.98 84.27 42.31 5.58 
Mauritania 433.36 64.17 89.99 20.66 3.94 
Uganda 272.86 84.05 117.88 16.53 2.81 
 
Country % pop 
with no 
schooling 
% pop 
with 
primary 
education 
% pop 
with 
secondary 
education 
% pop 
with 
tertiary 
education 
years of 
education 
Ghana 28.96 8.12 61.35 1.66 7.46 
Mauritania 38.47 46.40 13.38 1.77 4.06 
Uganda 19.77 67.30 9.82 3.12 4.85 
Source: Barro-Lee 2010 
For each of these three countries, we gained access to micro-data obtained from 
household surveys, which allowed us to investigate educational choices and labour 
market returns. The main objective of household surveys is to collect data on the socio-
economic characteristics of a country’s household population. The topics covered by the 
surveys are the demographic characteristics of the population, education, health, 
employment and time use, migration, housing conditions, household consumption, 
household income and household assets. Some surveys also include a community 
questionnaire in which information is collected at community level about the supply of a 
number of public goods, such as schools, sanitary services, transportation, markets, etc. 
Among the three countries taken into consideration, both the Uganda and the Ghana 
survey have a community questionnaire, although, in the Ghana survey, because of an 
unfortunate limitation in the design of the survey, the community data cannot be 
matched with household level information. 
The Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 2005/06, is a sample of 7,426 
households (almost 43,000 individuals) collected from May 2005 to April 2006. The 
Ghana Living Standards Survey-Round Five (GLSS 5) was carried out between January 
2005 and August 2006 and covered 8687 households (for a total of 37,128 household 
members). For Mauritania, the Continuous Survey on Household Living Conditions (EPCV) 
2000 survey collected a sample of 5,964 households, for a total of over 40,000 
individuals between August 2000 and 2001. 
All of the three surveys are nationally representative samples selected through a 
two-stage stratified clustered sampling method using Census data as the sampling frame. 
For our purposes, the relevant sections are those regarding: 
1. household demographic composition – in which information on age, gender, and 
position in the household are collected; 
2. individual education – collecting information on the number of years of school 
attended and the highest level of education attained by each individual in the 
household aged 5 or over; 
3. occupation, in which information is obtained for the occupational status of each 
individual over 15 and the individual wage. 
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Information at household level is also used and matched to each individual in the 
household, to measure housing characteristics, such as distance from the main water 
source or the type of roof on the house, and the total household consumption per adult 
equivalent. Total household consumption per adult equivalent is an aggregate provided 
by the statistical office that takes the household’s overall annual expenditure on food 
items, non-food items, consumer durables, and housing into account.9 The overall value 
of the household’s consumption is then adjusted for the cost-of-living differences within 
each country and for the household’s composition. While the questionnaires are 
substantially comparable, there are a few differences that should be pointed out. The first 
divergence concerns differences in each country’s educational system, which translate 
into different degrees. The following common categories have, however, been identified 
in each survey: no schooling, partial primary schooling, completed primary, junior 
secondary, senior secondary, post-secondary vocational education, college/university or 
higher. The number of years of education necessary to obtain each degree differs 
slightly; for this reason, the analysis also looks at the number of years of school 
completed at the time of the survey. 
When comparing macro-data in Table 8 with individual statistics from micro-data 
in Table 9, we see that country rankings are retained, despite with different averages in 
the years of education. Figure 7 plots the actual school attendance in our dataset, 
reporting the fraction of individuals coded as students (without knowing the level of 
school attended). According to this graph, Ghana begins schooling quite early (school 
attendance is 76% at the age of 5),10 while Uganda is characterised by higher attendance 
at the later stages of secondary school. It is rather surprising to record that Mauritania 
registers a school participation rate above 20% in the age range 20-25 (though we 
ignore the type of school attended).11 
The second divergence concerns occupational categories, which are also different. 
In the Uganda and the Ghana datasets, the following categories are provided: unpaid 
family worker, self-employed (own-account workers, OECD), employer, private 
employee, government employee. In the Mauritania dataset only four occupational 
groups could be identified: unpaid family worker, self-employed, private employee, and 
governmental employee. The self-employed group, in this case, includes both employers 
and self-employed – two groups that have different characteristics and usually have 
significantly different incomes. 
Table 9 – Descriptive statistics from household surveys – population 15-60 - 
2000-05 
 
observations 
years of 
education 
primary 
junior 
secondary 
senior 
secondary 
vocational/ 
post-
secondary 
degree 
Ghana 18,186 8.304 18.3% 34.4% 2.8% 3.7% 2.3% 
Mauritania 17,648 3.170 12.6% 8.1% 4.7% 0.1% 2.9% 
Uganda 17,221 6.199 12.6% 13.0% 1.8% 4.4% 0.9% 
Source: see text 
                                                
9 Durables and housing items are included according to a value of service criterion rather than 
according to the actual expenditure criterion. 
10 This partially contradicts White 2005, who claims that microdata for Ghana require postponing 
the age of school attendance when making comparison between administrative data on 
enrolment and household surveys. 
11 This data is mostly driven by the urban population, and possibly reflect class repetition due to 
failures.  
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Figure 7 – Population distribution by school participation – 2000-2005 
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3.1.  School participation 
We start by studying what makes people attend school. Using micro-data from the 
household survey provides a better picture of actual school participation, when compared 
with macro-data which are based upon administrative sources (White 2005). By knowing 
the actual condition of each family member, we may restrict the sample to the young 
component and study the family characteristics which are potentially correlated with the 
probability of still attending school. Clearly, we do not have precise information about the 
type of school attended, nor whether each boy or girl is actually attending school (or 
check questions of whether he or she attended school last week), but we take the 
question “Is … still in school?” as an indication of current attendance.12 In Tables A.1-A.2-
A.3, in the Appendix, we report the estimation of a full model of variables that could be 
associated to school participation. The most important results are summarised in Table 
10. 
Males consistently have a higher probability of attending school, the probability 
being higher wherever the average enrolment rates are lower. However, the crucial issue 
is whether income prevents children from attending school. The results are mixed. In 
Ghana, per capita consumption (acting as a proxy for family wealth – additional proxies, 
such as the materials used for roofs, do not show consistent results) - does not show a 
significant correlation with the probability of enrolment, though some negative correlation 
emerges with low-income jobs. In contrast, the same country shows much stronger 
correlation of the probability of child enrolment with parental education (especially with 
regard to the literacy of the mothers). At the other extreme, we have the case of 
Mauritania, where we find consistent indications of a scarcity of resources being 
negatively associated with school enrolment: in addition to per capita income showing 
the biggest marginal effect, there is also a positive association with the head of the 
household working as a public employee, which is typically associated with less volatile 
and higher earnings. Conversely, in the case of Mauritania, cultural resources seem less 
                                                
12 This is the form of the question for Ghana. In the case of Uganda it takes a slightly different 
form: “Have you ever attended any formal school? ….3= Currently attending school” In the 
questionnaire for Mauritania the question is “… fréquentet-il/elle l'école moderne 
actuellement ?″. 
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dependent on parental education (except in the case of a father or mother with a college 
degree). The situation of Uganda is somehow intermediate, because both family financial 
resources and parental education matter for the schooling of children. The co-efficients of 
both father and mother education show a favourable increasing trend, suggesting an 
increasing in the pressure to educate offspring. 
It is important to note that, in the case of Uganda, we have information about the 
source of household income: here, we are able to show that, when the main source 
comes from “transfers”, this helps to increase school attendance. In order to maintain 
comparability across the three samples, we have proxied the relative isolation of the 
community by using the (log of the) time to collect water from the main source (in 
minutes), which, however, does not emerge as being statistically significant in any of the 
samples.13 
Table 10 – Average marginal effect on the probability to be enrolled in school – 
population aged 4-25 
 
Ghana 
2005 
Mauritania 
2000 
Uganda 
2005 
Observations 1905 4184 5008 
urban 0.064* 0.183 -0.009 
male  0.042*** 0.126* 0.074*** 
Log real per adult equivalent household consumption 0.001 0.185** 0.063*** 
number family members 0.005 0.024*** 0.014*** 
father education==primary 0.070** -0.114 0.032 
father education==middle/junior secondary school 0.043** -0.018 0.035* 
father education==senior secondary school 0.079** 0.249 0.095*** 
father education==training college 0.143** 0.435* 0.109*** 
father education==tertiary 0.107 0.716*** 0.119* 
mother education==primary 0.099*** -0.191* 0.016 
mother education==middle/junior secondary school 0.081*** -0.080 0.026 
mother education== senior secondary school 0.009 -0.499** 0.056* 
mother education==training college -0.027 0.141 0.139** 
mother education==tertiary 0.050 1.000 0.028 
socio-economic group==Public 0.034 0.375** 1.000 
socio-economic group==wage private formal -0.169*** 0.029 0.0159 
socio-economic group==Wage private informal -0.109** na na 
socio-economic group==Self-agro-export 0.056 0.145 0.052 
socio-economic group==Self-agro-crop -0.102** 1.000 0.047 
socio-economic group==Self-business -0.070 0.030 0.032 
socio-economic group==family workers and others na -0.252 na 
socio-economic group==unemployed na 0.002 na 
earnings source==transfers na na 0.161*** 
Average log time to collect water from main source, 
minutes 
-0.005 0.002 -0.004 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Age, age squared and constant included as additional controls 
                                                
13 We have however information about the actual distance between local community and the 
nearest primary or secondary school, either public or private, for Uganda. In such a case the 
distance from secondary school is negatively and statistically significant. 
DOES EDUCATION REPRESENT A SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR LIFETIME IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA? 
 
22 
Overall, we summarise our main findings in Figure 8, which plots the marginal effect of 
financial resources (the marginal effect of per adult consumption) and cultural resources 
(the marginal effect of father with college training) when the model is separately 
estimated by gender. The co-efficients seem to depict a sort of frontier of “production 
possibilities” in terms of resource availability. Countries with high educational attainment 
face stronger constraints from cultural constraints associated to parental education, while 
countries with low educational attainment fight against household financial constraints. 
According to our results, financial aid may be effective in increasing enrolment 
when the average educational attainment is relatively low, as in the case of Uganda and 
Mauritania. In contrast, when a country achieves a sufficient level of educational 
attainment, the true obstacle may emerge from parental education and may require an 
improvement in the quality of teaching in order to overcome it. In both cases, any 
intervention able to increase school enrolment implies long-lasting benefits, given the 
positive spill-over of parental education on the probability of children attending school. 
Figure 8 - Average marginal effects on the probability of school attendance, by 
gender 
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3.2.  Return to education 
The standard model of human capital investment (Card 1999) explains educational 
choices in terms of costs and benefits, conditional on either the existence of perfect 
financial markets, or on sufficient family resources. While the role of costs (proxied by 
distance) and resources (proxied by family consumption) have already been discussed in 
the previous section, in the present section, we analyse the role of incentives. Although it 
is implausible, it nonetheless remains possible that low educational attainment can be 
accounted for by low return of educational certificates in the labour market. 
It is not easy to identify labour market return to education when significant shares 
of the population are either unemployed or employed in the informal sector. For this 
reason, we have identified five potential areas where we can assess whether education 
makes a difference: 
1. working or not working; 
2. obtaining a good job (in terms of wage and duration); 
3. earning a monetary wage; 
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4. reduce income volatility (as a proxy for the risk of income risk); 
5. attaining a decent level of consumption. 
In Table 11, we provide descriptive statistics for each of these measures. For 
these countries, the employment rate is significantly different: in the relevant population 
aged between 15 and 60; Ghana and Uganda achieve 72% and 77% respectively, while 
Mauritania scores 42% only. Nevertheless, for all countries, occupational groups are 
ordered in quite similar ways: family aid and self-employment are the least paid 
occupations, with the highest earnings variability; in contrast, public employment 
represents the top of the pay scale, associated with the lowest income risk. Interestingly 
enough, per capita consumption is ranked in a similar way, suggesting that some sort of 
assortative mating in the family composition is at work.14 
Table 11 – Occupations, wages and consumption for employed individuals – 
2000-2005 
Ghana 2005 
occupation observations 
for 
occupations 
mean  
(log) wage 
standard 
deviation  
log wages 
observations 
with positive 
wage 
median (log)  
per capita 
consumption 
unpaid family worker 5077 11.869 1.273 322 13.592 
own account worker 7984 12.405 1.259 6640 14.072 
employer 568 13.278 1.459 498 14.653 
private permanent 1513 13.241 0.931 1505 14.581 
govt permanent 803 13.891 0.913 790 14.759 
Total 15945 12.681 1.304 9755 14.023 
 
                                                
14 However, the sample correlation of (log of) individual wage and (log of) per capita consumption 
is not that high: 0.36 for Ghana, 0.47 for Uganda and 0.31 for Mauritania. 
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Mauritania 2000 
occupation observations 
for 
occupations 
mean  
(log) wage 
standard 
deviation  
log wages 
observations 
with positive 
wage 
median (log)  
per capita 
consumption 
unpaid family worker 3034 8.607 1.189 471 10.850 
own account worker 5103 na na na 11.261 
private employee 595 9.483 1.072 529 11.685 
government 
employee 
985 9.883 0.851 902 11.808 
Total 9717 9.456 1.130 1902 11.214 
Uganda 2005 
occupation observations 
for 
occupations 
mean  
(log) wage 
standard 
deviation  
log wages 
observations 
with positive 
wage 
median (log)  
per capita 
consumption 
unpaid family worker 9234 10.159 0.851 537 10.266 
own account worker 7637 10.544 0.947 1295 10.326 
employer 94 11.342 1.128 26 10.634 
private employee 2219 10.969 1.033 2056 10.646 
government 
employee 
463 12.122 0.817 444 11.122 
Total 19647 10.863 1.093 4358 10.355 
 
In Table A.4 in the Appendix, we estimate the relevant correlations for the 
probability of being employed (columns 1-2-5-6-9-10) and for climbing up in the social 
ladder represented by occupational groups (columns 3-4-7-8-11-12). In the first case, we 
use a probit model, while in the latter we adopted and ordered the probit one. Education 
is expressed either through dummies (odd columns) or in years of education (even 
columns). 
With regard to employment probability, we find that educational attainment tends 
to be negatively correlated with employment probability (especially for Ghana and 
Mauritania), as if the limited employment probabilities were reduced by the expectations 
of educated people (sometimes indicated as the “excessive choosiness” of graduates).15 
They seem to confirm that education does not help people to enter the labour force, 
rather the opposite. But looking carefully at Table 11, one has to consider that between 
one third (Ghana and Mauritania) and half (Uganda) of the subjects classified as 
“employed” are actually taking up unpaid family jobs! These results are consistent with 
labour markets which are segmented between formal and informal dimensions, in which 
educated workers accept only high-quality jobs and possibly experience long spells of 
unemployment and/or migration. But education may favour the transformation into 
formal labour markets, since the availability of an educated (domestic) labour force may 
be capable of attracting foreign capital (Checchi et al. 2007). 
                                                
15 In some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, secondary and tertiary education are associated with 
higher unemployment rates among youth . One possible explanation proposed by Garcia and 
Fares 2008 is that the more educated youth are, the higher their reservation wage and returns 
to job search.  
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Thus, formal education goes hand in hand with formal labour markets, and the former 
has problems in proceeding without the latter. If a person is employed in paid work, 
education seems effective in pushing that person up the social ladder. Whenever an 
educational credential is taken to a formal labour market, it becomes a powerful vehicle 
for better job opportunities, the effect being stronger where the average educational 
attainment is higher (as in the case of Ghana). These results are summarised in Table 12 
and plotted in Figure 9, where the marginal effect of an additional year of education on 
the probability of entering a well-paid occupation increases with the desirability of the 
same occupation. 
Table 12 – Average marginal effect of one additional year of schooling 
 Ghana2005 Mauritania 
2000 
Uganda 2005 
probability of being employed -0.003** -0.007*** -0.001* 
probability of becoming unpaid family 
worker 
-0.019*** -0.025*** -0.011*** 
probability of becoming own account 
worker 
-0.006*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 
probability of becoming employer 0.002***  0.001*** 
probability of becoming private employee 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
probability of becoming government 
employee 
0.012*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figure 9 - Average marginal effect of one year of schooling onto the probability 
of achieving specific employment positions 
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We then estimate a traditional Mincerian equation among those reporting a 
positive wage (see Table A.5 in the Appendix). Since being employed in the formal labour 
market could represent a positive self-selection, we have also considered household per 
capita consumption as an alternative welfare measure at individual level.16 In Table 13, 
                                                
16 If formal education provides adequate returns only when spent in formal labour market, one has 
to consider the potential self-selection into formal occupation. However, in order to formally 
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we report the most significant results given by the (average) percentage increase in the 
wage rate (or in the consumption per capita) associated to an additional year of 
education. The estimated OLS co-efficients could be biased due to either unobservables 
(for example, ability) and/or to measurement errors, and therefore we resort to 
instrumental variable estimation, using father education as an instrument for the years of 
child education.17 IV (instrumental variable estimation) returns tend to be higher than 
OLS ones, indicating downward biases in standard OLS regressions. What is most 
surprising is that returns to education are higher in countries in which the average 
educational attainment in the population is also higher, contradicting a standard 
framework of relative supply and demand for human capital, but being fully compatible 
with a model of increasing returns in human capital growth. 
Table 13 – Return to education of one year of schooling 
 Ghana 2005 Mauritania 
2000 
Uganda 2005 
wage return to one year of schooling (OLS) 0.094*** 0.060*** 0.093*** 
wage return to one year of schooling (IV) 0.160*** 0.065*** 0.133*** 
consumption return to one year of schooling 
(OLS) 0.055*** 0.032*** 0.057*** 
consumption return to one year of schooling 
(IV) 0.188*** 0.086*** 0.096*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
We can then summarise the results obtained so far by claiming that schooling 
brings in a double dividend in the labour market, as it is associated with both better jobs 
and higher wages. The main obstacle is represented by the extent of the formal labour 
markets, since both gains materialise conditional to entering formal employment. 
However, even abstracting from the formal employment relationship, education is, on 
average, rewarded through higher levels of consumption at household level, through 
either higher self-employment incomes or through positive association to spouse income. 
                                                                                                                                                   
estimate this process (using for example an approach à la Heckman), one needs to introduce 
identifying restrictions, which account for increased probability of being employed in the formal 
sector of the economy without being correlated with the wage outcome. Since we were unable 
to trace out potential variables for the selection equation, we have followed an alternative rule. 
Despite being outside the formal labour market for whatever reason (rural area, negative 
shocks, family disruption, etc), if there exist assortative mating an educated person is more 
likely to enjoy higher level of welfare through the spouse. For this reason in table 13 we have 
also considered the per-capita consumption measured at household level as proxy for individual 
welfare. 
17 In the case of omitted variables, a potential instrument should not be correlated with the omitted 
variable. If there is intergenerational genetic transmission of ability, the educational attainment 
of parents would be correlated with unobservable ability of the child. Educational reforms would 
be more appropriate as instruments, but given the low level of enforceability they may be 
ineffective in raising educational attainment. Therefore the results presented in table 13 are just 
indicative of the potential existence of biases, more than presenting an unbiased estimate of the 
exact return to an additional year of education. 
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4.  Policy discussion and conclusions 
In the present paper, we have shown that the consideration of educational choices gives 
more role to social protection schemes. Without disputing whether they have to take the 
form of conditional or unconditional cash transfers, we have seen that parental money 
matters with regard to whether children attend school or not. At least, this is true for the 
three countries which we have explicitly considered: Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda; but 
macro evidence behaves in accordance with our finding in the micro-data. 
We have also found that education makes a difference in the working life of the 
individual. It may represent an obstacle to entering the formal labour market, because it 
probably raises expectations which are incompatible with existing employment 
conditions. But once the transition has occurred, an additional year of education is 
associated with better employment prospects, higher wages and reduced income 
volatility. We have also extended the analysis to welfare distribution, by using 
consumption (equivalised at household level) as proxy for it: even in such a case, 
additional education is associated with higher (life-time) welfare. 
Combining these results provides an inter-temporal twist in the analysis of actual 
social protection schemes. As long as they relax the financial constraints on poor families, 
they increase school opportunities of the offspring of the poor, an effect which is stronger 
with conditional cash transfers. Additional education in the young generation translates 
into less need for social protection when they are adults: on average, they will be better 
employed and less exposed to the risk of unemployment, thus killing two birds with one 
stone. 
This is obviously not the end of the story. We have seen that schooling is also 
prevented by a (lack of) cultural support from educated parents, as well as by cultural 
heritage (colonial past experience, quality of institutions). But, once again, a current 
investment in education has an inter-generational positive spill-over, since it relaxes 
cultural constraints on the following generation. Other papers (Filmer and Prichett 1999, 
Filmer 2007) have highlighted the importance of school quality compared to school 
availability. Our results do not contradict their findings, since community isolation does 
not seem to be an obstacle to the probability of attending school. Nevertheless, a more 
detailed analysis based upon detailed information regarding the quality and quantity of 
the education provided would be necessary, since aggregate data are not perfectly 
consistent with this claim. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 - Determinants of child enrolment – population aged 4-25 - Ghana 
2005 - Probit 
 1 2 3 4 
 
all 
enrolled 
all 
enrolled 
male 
enrolled 
female 
enrolled 
age (years) 0.3 0.311 0.247 0.31 
 [6.13]*** [6.45]*** [4.57]*** [6.05]*** 
age² -0.016 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 
 [9.21]*** [9.46]*** [7.14]*** [9.01]*** 
urban 0.207 0.323 0.459 0.063 
 [1.47] [2.26]** [2.95]*** [0.44] 
male 0.195 0.212   
 [2.31]** [2.56]**   
Log real per adult equivalent household consumption -0.014 0.005 0.1 0.092 
 [0.15] [0.05] [0.99] [1.05] 
number family members 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.027 
 [1.44] [1.41] [1.16] [1.40] 
father educ==primary 0.314 0.351 0.369 0.153 
 [1.68]* [2.02]** [1.43] [0.71] 
father educ==middle/junior secondary school 0.119 0.215 0.27 0.24 
 [1.12] [2.08]** [1.71]* [1.69]* 
father educ==senior secondary school 0.33 0.397 0.448 0.438 
 [1.70]* [2.05]** [1.46] [1.54] 
father educ==training college 0.674 0.717 0.597 0.751 
 [1.97]* [1.98]** [1.84]* [2.33]** 
father educ==tertiary 0.702 0.54 0.378 0.792 
 [1.37] [0.93] [0.87] [0.70] 
mother educ==primary 0.495 0.499 0.392 0.622 
 [3.40]*** [3.45]*** [1.79]* [3.19]*** 
mother educ==middle/junior secondary school 0.332 0.409 0.334 0.408 
 [2.61]*** [3.27]*** [2.03]** [2.57]** 
mother educ==senior secondary school 0.071 0.049 0.23 0 
 [0.23] [0.15] [0.65] [0.00] 
mother educ==training college -0.155 -0.136 -0.075 -0.063 
 [0.47] [0.41] [0.14] [0.12] 
mother educ==tertiary 0.113 0.252  0.721 
 [0.29] [0.56]  [0.39] 
socio-economic group==Public 0.199 0.174 0.557 -0.405 
 [0.61] [0.51] [1.55] [1.33] 
socio-economic group==Wage-priv-formal -0.829 -0.846 -0.648 -1.136 
 [2.71]*** [2.83]*** [2.08]** [3.21]*** 
socio-economic group==Wage-priv-informal -0.53 -0.548 -0.365 -0.747 
 [2.07]** [2.13]** [1.21] [2.44]** 
socio-economic group==Self-agro-export 0.309 0.281 0.586 -0.059 
 [1.00] [0.93] [1.56] [0.18] 
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socio-economic group==Self-agro-crop -0.368 -0.515 -0.304 -0.786 
 [1.53] [2.21]** [1.24] [3.12]*** 
socio-economic group==Self-business -0.282 -0.351 -0.113 -0.519 
 [1.28] [1.62] [0.47] [2.08]** 
Average log time to collect water from main source, minutes -0.019 -0.028 -0.013 -0.034 
 [1.03] [1.47] [0.59] [1.83]* 
roof==palme leaves/raffia/thatch -1.153    
 [5.88]***    
roof==corrugated iron sheets -0.315    
 [2.30]**    
Observations 1905 1905 769 1135 
t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - survey robust errors 
– constant included 
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Table A.2 - Determinants of child enrolment – population aged 4-25 – 
Mauritania 2000 – Probit 
 1 2 3 
 
all 
enrolled 
male 
enrolled 
female 
enrolled 
age -0.342 -0.291 -0.375 
 [7.38]*** [5.66]*** [7.25]*** 
age² 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 [3.04]*** [2.25]** [3.80]*** 
urban 0.183 0.279 0.353 
 [1.27] [3.15]*** [4.15]*** 
male 0.126   
 [1.90]*   
Log real per adult equivalent household consumption 0.185 0.264 0.244 
 [2.07]** [4.11]*** [3.87]*** 
number family members  0.025 0.031 0.03 
 [2.78]*** [3.20]*** [3.54]*** 
father education==less than primary -0.114 0.02 -0.098 
 [0.81] [0.10] [0.55] 
father education==completed primary -0.018 -0.201 0.008 
 [0.09] [1.24] [0.05] 
father education==college 0.25 0.082 0.282 
 [1.26] [0.38] [1.42] 
father education==lycee 0.436 0.307 -0.07 
 [1.66]* [1.11] [0.26] 
father education==degree 0.717 1.011 0.237 
 [4.30]*** [1.96]* [0.72] 
mother education==less than primary -0.191 -0.035 -0.496 
 [1.68]* [0.22] [3.80]*** 
mother education==completed primary -0.08 -0.022 -0.375 
 [0.44] [0.12] [2.40]** 
mother education==college -0.5 -0.437 -0.314 
 [2.50]** [1.51] [1.10] 
mother education==lycee 0.142 -0.347 0.08 
 [0.40] [0.69] [0.12] 
mother education==degree 0 0 0 
 [.] [.] [.] 
socio-economic group==government employee 0.375 0.196 0.412 
 [2.36]** [1.17] [2.45]** 
socio-economic group==private sector employee 0.03 -0.135 0.173 
 [0.15] [0.65] [0.88] 
socio-economic group==self-employed agriculture  0.145 -0.056 -0.052 
 [0.99] [0.55] [0.49] 
socio-economic group==self-employed not agriculture 0.03 -0.113 0.047 
 [0.20] [1.05] [0.43] 
socio-economic group==family workers and others -0.252 -0.471 -0.076 
 [1.18] [2.17]** [0.25] 
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socio-economic group==unemployed 0.002 0.117 -0.104 
 [0.01] [0.81] [0.75] 
Average log time to collect water from main source, minutes 0.002 0.016 0 
 [0.12] [1.41] [0.04] 
Observations 4184 2119 2065 
t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - survey robust errors 
– constant included 
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Table A.3 - Determinants of child enrolment – population aged 4-25 – Uganda 
2005 – Probit 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
all 
enrolled 
all 
enrolled 
male 
enrolled 
female 
enrolled 
all 
enrolled 
age 0.373 0.375 0.436 0.338 0.383 
 [9.39]*** [9.43]*** [9.28]*** 
[5.24]**
* [9.45]*** 
age2 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 
 
[12.97]**
* 
[13.02]**
* 
[11.82]**
* 
[7.88]**
* 
[12.95]**
* 
substratum -0.06 -0.047 -0.024 -0.097 -0.098 
 [0.71] [0.57] [0.20] [0.81] [1.23] 
male 0.354 0.357   0.354 
 [6.43]*** [6.50]***   [6.32]*** 
Log real per adult equivalent household consumption 0.261 0.304 0.259 0.337 0.274 
 [5.38]*** [6.38]*** [4.46]*** 
[4.82]**
* [5.78]*** 
numb.household members 0.069 0.072 0.074 0.07 0.071 
 [8.59]*** [9.20]*** [5.89]*** 
[7.14]**
* [8.92]*** 
father educ==less than primary 0.159 0.155 0.222 0.108 0.158 
 [1.96]* [1.89]* [1.88]* [0.95] [1.92]* 
father educ==completed primary 0.179 0.169 0.158 0.224 0.167 
 [1.90]* [1.79]* [1.19] [1.77]* [1.75]* 
father educ==completed o level 0.471 0.462 0.582 0.419 0.471 
 [3.85]*** [3.77]*** [3.17]*** 
[2.85]**
* [3.85]*** 
father educ==completed A level 0.533 0.527 0.565 0.57 0.538 
 [3.34]*** [3.31]*** [2.27]** 
[2.91]**
* [3.30]*** 
father educ==completed university 0.581 0.577 0.201 1.094 0.57 
 [1.96]* [1.94]* [0.52] [2.44]** [1.90]* 
mother educ==less than primary 0.06 0.08 0.162 0.003 0.078 
 [0.80] [1.07] [1.68]* [0.03] [1.04] 
mother educ==completed primary 0.098 0.13 0.199 0.096 0.109 
 [1.10] [1.48] [1.62] [0.81] [1.25] 
mother educ==completed o level 0.242 0.273 0.09 0.437 0.264 
 [1.52] [1.72]* [0.42] [2.36]** [1.64] 
mother educ==completed A level 0.647 0.674 1.306 0.397 0.835 
 [2.06]** [2.18]** [1.45] [0.87] [2.69]*** 
mother educ==completed university 0.188 0.138 0.004  0.169 
 [0.31] [0.23] [0.01]  [0.28] 
earnings source==subsistence farming 0.185 0.23 0.067 0.351 0.21 
 [0.98] [1.21] [0.26] [1.73]* [1.08] 
earnings source==commercial farming 0.206 0.255 -0.191 0.59 0.239 
 [0.81] [1.02] [0.59] [2.01]** [0.94] 
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earnings source==wage employment 0.038 0.077 -0.133 0.204 0.048 
 [0.19] [0.39] [0.49] [0.89] [0.23] 
earnings source==non agricultural enterprises 0.112 0.156 0.084 0.224 0.135 
 [0.54] [0.76] [0.30] [1.01] [0.66] 
earnings source==transfers 0.729 0.778 0.438 1.056 0.735 
 [3.19]*** [3.40]*** [1.39] 
[4.17]**
* [3.17]*** 
Average log time to collect water from main source, 
minutes -0.021 -0.021 -0.135 0.045  
 [0.36] [0.36] [1.67]* [0.67]  
roof==thatch, straw -0.221     
 [0.58]     
roof==iron sheets -0.053     
 [0.14]     
log distance km nearest primary school, private or 
public      0 
     [0.02] 
log distance km nearest secondary school, private or 
public      -0.028 
     [2.27]** 
Observations 5008 5008 2148 2857 4963 
t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - survey robust errors 
– constant included 
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Table A.4 - Determinants of occupational status – Probit for “employed” and ordered probit for “occupation” 
 Ghana 2005 Mauritania 2000 Uganda 2005 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 employed employed occupation occupation employed employed occupation occupation employed employed occupation occupation 
male 0.232 0.174 0.601 0.505 0.867 0.867 0.741 0.736 0.117 0.387 0.676 0.781 
 [7.83]*** [5.19]*** [19.69]*** [15.88]*** [15.46]*** [15.38]*** [12.07]*** [12.04]*** [3.36]*** [7.91]*** [27.50]*** [28.69]*** 
age (years) 0.254 0.304 0.164 0.161 0.09 0.094 0.074 0.073 0.13 0.108 0.168 0.12 
 [30.37]*** [32.78]*** [17.10]*** [15.45]*** [10.40]*** [11.05]*** [4.97]*** [4.95]*** [16.79]*** [11.99]*** [22.42]*** [13.83]*** 
age² -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 [26.64]*** [27.46]*** [15.45]*** [13.61]*** [8.37]*** [8.73]*** [2.84]*** [2.78]*** [12.29]*** [10.41]*** [19.67]*** [12.43]*** 
urban -0.483 -0.564 0.584 0.552 -0.4 -0.41 0.767 0.762 -0.774 -0.643 0.546 0.576 
 [8.69]*** [9.88]*** [13.15]*** [12.59]*** [4.50]*** [4.45]*** [6.88]*** [6.82]*** [16.25]*** [11.46]*** [10.95]*** [11.18]*** 
numb. children -0.015 -0.027 -0.076 -0.086 0.062 0.062 -0.066 -0.066 0.008 0.008 -0.095 -0.088 
 [1.61] [2.48]** [8.73]*** [8.80]*** [2.67]*** [2.63]*** [2.49]** [2.49]** [1.03] [0.81] [14.43]*** [13.34]*** 
primary (not completed) 0.635  -0.799  -0.095  0.39  0.834  0.421  
 [1.06]  [0.84]  [1.30]  [4.19]***  [19.51]***  [14.30]***  
primary (completed) 0.235  -0.653  -0.228  0.536  0.796  0.434  
 [0.39]  [0.69]  [2.97]***  [5.97]***  [15.23]***  [11.65]***  
post-primary training          1.126  1.721  
         [8.41]***  [16.36]***  
junior secondary -0.25  0.399  -0.374  1.058  0.793  0.534  
 [5.50]***  [10.82]***  [5.40]***  [11.47]***  [13.69]***  [13.13]***  
senior secondary -0.654  0.915  -0.174  1.339  0.489  0.878  
 [7.80]***  [9.22]***  [2.23]**  [10.41]***  [3.74]***  [6.22]***  
post-secondary training -0.15  1.422  0.594  1.403  0.695  1.795  
 [1.98]**  [19.23]***  [1.21]  [2.83]***  [6.91]***  [16.26]***  
college degree -0.039  1.795  -0.234  1.303  0.017  0.7  
 [0.44]  [18.79]***  [2.11]**  [7.08]***  [0.08]  [3.09]***  
Years of schooling completed  -0.012  0.094  -0.022  0.093  -0.01  0.039 
  [2.04]**  [17.08]***  [4.08]***  [13.48]***  [1.83]*  [9.87]*** 
Observations 18186 12405 13050 8231 17648 17648 7403 7403 17221 13480 13905 12265 
t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - survey robust errors – constant included 
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Table A.5 – Returns to education – (log)wages and (log)consumption per capita - OLS 
 Ghana 2005 Mauritania 2005 Uganda 2005 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
ols log 
wage 
ols log 
wage 
iv log 
wage 
ols log 
consu
m 
ols log 
consu
m 
iv log 
consu
m 
ols log 
wage 
ols log 
wage 
iv log 
wage 
ols log 
consu
m 
ols log 
consu
m 
iv log 
consu
m 
ols log 
wage 
ols log 
wage 
iv log 
wage 
ols log 
consu
m 
ols log 
consu
m 
iv log 
consu
m 
male 0.374 0.305 0.228 -0.096 -0.114 -0.228 0.288 0.286 0.343 
-
0.007 
-
0.007 -0.067 0.426 0.343 0.233 -0.017 -0.075 -0.168 
  
[12.14
]*** 
[9.43]
*** 
[5.98]
*** 
[9.01]
*** 
[9.37]
*** 
[11.80
]*** 
[2.48]
** 
[2.45]
** 
[5.12]
*** [0.48] [0.48] 
[5.66]
*** 
[15.36
]*** 
[11.94
]*** 
[6.44]
*** [1.58] 
[6.90]
*** 
[11.09
]*** 
age (years) 0.051 0.041 0.026 0.019 0.026 -0.007 0.052 0.051 0.086 0.009 0.008 0.024 0.062 0.067 0.047 -0.015 0.001 -0.01 
  
[5.36]
*** 
[3.71]
*** 
[2.31]
** 
[5.50]
*** 
[6.29]
*** [1.52] [1.05] [0.99] 
[5.61]
*** 
[1.97]
** [1.51] 
[7.95]
*** 
[6.87]
*** 
[7.31]
*** 
[4.67]
*** 
[4.34]
*** [0.16] 
[2.66]
*** 
ge² -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0.001 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 0 0 
  
[4.53]
*** 
[3.09]
*** 
[2.08]
** 
[4.39]
*** 
[5.53]
*** [0.21] [0.46] [0.43] 
[3.81]
*** [0.64] [0.48] 
[4.33]
*** 
[6.16]
*** 
[6.02]
*** 
[3.37]
*** 
[3.51]
*** [0.86] 
[4.06]
*** 
urban 0.545 0.554 0.454 0.461 0.437 0.217 0.543 0.529 0.298 0.537 0.542 0.364 0.527 0.472 0.307 0.591 0.493 0.306 
  
[10.36
]*** 
[10.06
]*** 
[10.01
]*** 
[11.75
]*** 
[11.43
]*** 
[9.29]
*** 
[2.00]
** 
[1.90]
* 
[4.61]
*** 
[7.04]
*** 
[6.79]
*** 
[23.34
]*** 
[12.48
]*** 
[10.34
]*** 
[6.79]
*** 
[14.79
]*** 
[14.65
]*** 
[16.33
]*** 
primary (not 
completed) -0.437   0.094   0.305   0.156   0.028   -0.161   
  
[5.44]
***   [0.44]   
[2.12]
**   
[2.61]
***   [0.59]   
[6.49]
***   
primary 
(completed) -0.29   0.336   0.435   0.235   0.217   0.001   
  
[2.92]
***   [1.56]   
[3.38]
***   
[4.80]
***   
[3.67]
***   [0.05]   
post-primary 
training              1.097   0.434   
              
[17.24
]***   
[9.52]
***   
junior 
secondary 0.367   0.409   0.487   0.365   0.62   0.203   
  
[7.50]
***   
[15.63
]***   
[2.90]
***   
[6.49]
***   
[9.65]
***   
[7.19]
***   
senior 
secondary 0.779   0.508   0.691   0.416   0.959   0.466   
  
[9.15]
***   
[12.00
]***   
[3.96]
***   
[6.66]
***   
[7.20]
***   
[8.59]
***   
post-
secondary 
training 0.934   0.628   0.628   0.349   1.387   0.754   
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[15.03
]***   
[16.97
]***   [1.57]   
[2.22]
**   
[17.76
]***   
[14.65
]***   
college degree 1.591   1.015   1.137   0.483   1.19   0.785   
  
[17.01
]***   
[19.13
]***   
[6.12]
***   
[6.80]
***   
[6.72]
***   
[8.20]
***   
Years of 
schooling 
completed  0.094 0.16  0.055 0.188  0.06 0.065  0.032 0.086  0.093 0.133  0.057 0.096 
  
[15.38
]*** 
[8.26]
***  
[16.47
]*** 
[17.02
]***  
[5.57]
*** 
[9.99]
***  
[7.44]
*** 
[25.59
]***  
[21.27
]*** 
[16.06
]***  
[21.34
]*** 
[24.55
]*** 
Observations 8741 6309 5554 18219 12425 9076 1695 1695 1520 17648 17648 14915 4087 3900 3109 17968 13511 10786 
R-squared 0.21 0.18  0.27 0.21  0.21 0.2  0.23 0.23  0.39 0.37  0.2 0.24  
t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - survey robust errors – constant included 
